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STOCKHOLDERS AS GENERAL CREDITORS
May one occupying the legal status of a stockholder ever
be permitted to change his status to that of a creditor and com-
pete with ordinary creditors in the assets of an insolvent corpor-
ation?
It is the purpose here to briefly discuss the principles which
should govern the right of a stockholder to share with creditors,
or to state it another way, to consider the elements which must
exist in order to enable corporate creditors or their legal repre-
sentatives to prevent stockholders from decreasing te fund out
of which their claim would otherwise be paid in full.
Whenever a corporation contracts for the cancellation of
a stock subscription or contracts for the repurchase of its stock
the execution of such contract results in a withdrawal of corpor-
ate assets and may injuriously affect the rights of creditors or
other stockholders.' The general rule is that there can 'be no
withdrawal of the assets of a corporation by the stockholders
until all of the debts of the corporation have been paid and
there can be no cancellation of a subscription for capital stock
without the consent of other stockholders.2
Some courts have said that the corporate assets are a trust
fund for the satisfaction of creditors.3 Other courts have denied
the trust fund theory and have worked out the rights of credi-
tors to the corporate assets as against stockholders by applying
strictly equitable principles based upon actual or presumed re-
'When a subscription for capital stock is unpaid the subscriber Is
regarded as a debtor of the corporation. Edwards v. Schillinger, 245
Il1. 231, 91 N. E. 1048.
2Potts v. Wallace, 146 U. S. 689; Scottish Security Company, Re-
ceiver, v. Starkes, 117 Ky. 609, 78 S. W. 455; Gaithright v. Oil ity Land
Company, 56 S. W. 163, (Ky.).
'Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U. S. 610; Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417 on
page 427; Spencer v. Smith, 201 Federal 647.
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liance by creditors upon the stockholders' apparent relationship
to the corporation and upon the apparent corporate assets. 4
The "trust fund theory" is merely a rule of equity.5 He-
gardless of any labeled theory, it appears that just, as a member
of a co-partnership cannot contract away any of his personal
liability as a member of the firm, so are the officers and members
of a corporation forbidden to contract away, either directly or
indirectly, any portion of the capital stock which takes the
place of personal liability in the case of a private co-partner-
,ship.6  As, however, co-partners may, as among themselves,
limit their liability or responsibility for the debts of the co-part-
nership, so likewise may stockholders, as among themselves, or
with the corporation, contract for a preference, limit their lia-
bility, or provide for a resale of their stock.7
But such contracts may not be permitted to affect other
stockholders who subsequently purchase stock in reliance upon
4Shaw et al. v. Robinson-Stokes Co., 50 Neb. 493, 669 N. W. 947; First
National Bank v. Guston Company, 42 Minn. 327, 44 N. W. 198; Coyt v.
Gold Amalgamating Company, 119 U. S. 343. In 'the case last citbd
Justice Bradley said:
"That trust (in favor of creditors) does not arise absolutely in
every case, where capital stock hts been settled.for by arrangement
with the company. It is not as if stockholders had given their
notes for that amount; these notes being in the treasury of the
company; but there' are other equities to which the stockholders
are entitled . . . . on which they are to stand."
In case of Koutze v. Blockman, 284 Federal 962, the Court said:
"'The'rule that the subscribed and unpaid stock of an insolvent
corporation becomes a trust fund for the paymbnt of claims to
Preditors is not an inflexible one. It has its exceptions. It will not
be applied in a case where the result will be inequitable. It will be
released where its operation will result in injustice. Czark v.
Beaver, 139 U. S. 96. We think the court below properly held that
as between appellant and appellee the equities of the latter pre-
vailed."
25 American Law Review, 749.
OSanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56.
"Porter v. Plymouth Gold Mining Company, 29- Mont. 347, 74 Pa-
cific 938; Rides v. Delker Sons Company, 145 Ky. 634, 140 S. W. 1011.
But the court in the last case said:
"If the purpose in providing for these peculiar shares was to
arrange matters so that, under any circumstances, a part of the
principal of the stock might be withdrawn before the full discharge"
of all' corporate debts, the devise would be contrary to the nature of
capital stock, opposed to public policy and void as to crelitors af-
fected thereby."
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the apparent status as stockholders of those who have con-
tracted for the right to resell or Withdraw their inter ast in the
corporate enterprise." Reliance on the part of other stockhold-
ers is not presumed.but must.be affirmatively shown.9  On the
other hand such contracts may be permitted to affect erecitors
who deal with the corpordtion with a knowledge of them' 10
Where .credit has.been extended to a corporation after the stock
subscription or after the making of a contract pertaining to its
resale or cancellation, those extending such credit as ordinary
creditors are presumed to have done so on the faith of such
asset." Where credit has been extended before such coutracts
are made no such presumption can arise.' 2
AR= CONTRACTS FOR WiTHDRWAL VoID AB INTmo I
It has often been stated that these contracts or 'arrange-
ments are contrary to public policy.'3 This kind of language
implies that these contracts are void ab initio whereas the author,-
ities show them to be merely unenforcible under certain circum-
stances.14 "Public policy' is a wonderfully flexible term. The
test as to whether or not a contract is contrary to public policy
as far as its validity as distinguished from its enforceability is
concerned, is its evil tendency and not its actual iiljury to the
public in a particular instance.' 5 It may well be that with this
aRandall Printing Company v. Sanitas Mineral Wafer Company, 120
Minn. 268, 139 N. W. 606; Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530, 6 S. W. 582.
"Walradt v. Barkley, Uli Neb. 67, 196 N. W. 928.1
'Hospes v. Northwestern Manufacturing Company, 48 Minn. 174,
60 N. W. 1117; Great Western Mining Company v. Harris, 128 Federal
321; Coyt v. North American Gold Amalgamating Company, 14 Federal
12, affirmed in 119 U. S. 343.
uScott v. Abbott, 160 Federal 573, where the creditors had made
loans to the company after the increase of its stock, the court saying:
"Indeed, if it had not been proved the law would indulge the
presumption that credit was given to the Shoe Company in reliance
upon the increased capital."
12Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S.,417, where the court saidt
"Only subsequent creditors are entitled to enforce their, claims
against these stockholders, since it is only they who could by any
legal presumption have trusted the company upon the faith of the
Increased stock."
"Spencer v. Smith, 201 Federal 647; Elsworth v. Lyons, 181 Fed-
eral, 55, on page 58; Guaranty Company v. Galveston City Railway Com-
pany, 107 Federal 311.
"Sham v. Robertson and Stoker, 50 Neb. 403, 69 N. W. 947.
lGordon v. Gordon, 168 Ky. 409, 182 S. W. 220, and cases cited in
note 23, Volume 13, Corpus Juris, page 425.
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meaning of public policy in mind that some arrangements for
the withdrawal of capital-whether such arrangements be for
the cancellation of stock subscriptions or for the repurchase of
stock-should be regarded as void ab initio. Such an arrange-
ment would be one made in secret for the purpose, primarily,
of benefitting the stockholder rather than the corporation, in
advance of credit by others and with the very contemplation of
a competition between the holder of such an arrangement and
creditors. But where such an arrangement is made for the re-
purchase of corporate stock or for the cancellation of a stock
subscription and made openly, regularly, for the benefit of the
corporation, and in good faith, it would seem that it might be
enforcible except as against those who have actually been preju-
diced thereby.
There is no rule of positive law in most states which ar-
bitrarily forbids a stockholder, either expressly or by necessary
implication, from assuming to affect, the position of a creditor.
The Bankruptcy Act as such contains no such provision except
as it may require the claim as against the corporation to have
accrued before the petition in bankruptcy is filed. It has often
been assumed that upon the dissolution of an insolvent corpora-
tion, especially in bankruptcy court, that the claims of corporate
creditors always have a priority over the claims of stockholders
regardless of the character of the relationship between the parti-
cular stockholder and the corporation. It is submitted that if
equitable rules and principles govern that competition rather
than some arbitrary rule of public policy or trust fund theory
that a stockholder might, in a given case, prove himself entitled
to share with general creditors, but it would seem that he should
not in any case be permitted to have priority over them.
ELEMENTS AFFECTING STOCKHOLDERS' RIGHTS
It seems material to consider, in determining the position
of a stockholder who has arranged with a corporation for the
repurchase of his stock, the preferring of his stock, or the can-
cellation of his subscription, to note when the contract was made
with reference to the time of the formation of the corporation
in order to determine whether or not he was in reality dealing
with an organized entity; to note whether the cancellation of
the obligation or the withdrawal of the assets is to take place at
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a time when the corporation is in a failing condition; to note
whether the contract is intended merely for the purpose of se-
curing a priority by one stockholder over another upon dissolu-
tion; lo note whether the arrangement is a secret one or one to
be spread upon the corporate records or to be recorded in a
public office; to note whether the contract for withdrawal is de-
liberately calculated and intended to withdraw assets from the
reach of creditors such as the arrangement in the federal case
of Spencer v. Smith,'6 (if the arrangement in that case was any-
thing more than a provision for a preference among stockhold-
ers themselves) ; to note whether in the case of a contract for
the repurchase of stock, such contract was made at the time of
the issuance of the stock and in consideration thereof or was
given to the stockholder after he had become such; to note
whether the contract provides for the taking up of the stock or the
cancellation of the relationship at a time certain or at the option
of the stockholder; to note whether or not at the time when the
option was actually exercised by the stockholder to change his
status from that of a stockholder to a, creditor, the corporation
was solvent or insolvent; to note whether the contract is predom-
inantly in the nature of a loan transaction whereby money is
advanced to the corporation with the stock issued as collateral;
to determine whether or not the contract or arrangement ac-
tually benefited the corporation; to note whether the creditors
or stockholders who are objecting to the performance of such a
contract were in existence at the time the contract was made;
to note whether or not the contract provides for a priority over
creditors or provides only for the right to share with creditors;
to note whether the contract specifically contemplates the incur-
ring of debts after its execution and the securing of a preference
over creditors as in the case of Guaranty Trust Company v.
Galveston City Railway,17 to determine whether or not the stock
really issued was issued contrary to law and to determine
whether or not the stockholder was induced to purchase his stock
as a result of the fraud of the corporation.
Where a corporation is just being formed and where one
of the members of the corporate enterprise stipulates for the




cies and at.his option, such a contract should.be regardedps. on-
trary to public policy, and void fiom its inception as being.a con-
tract which, by reason of its inherent character and necessary
tendency, is calculated to mislead those likely to extend credit
to the corporation. Such a contract cannot be regarded as
having been made for the corporation's benefit but can only be
regarded as having been made for the benefit and.,protection of
one of the organizers.18
In the case of such a contract by a. corporation that is, just
being formed, the corporation as an entity being entirely in the
hands of its formers, the contract is not in reality two-sided and
might not be enforcible even as against the corporation itself
and even at a time *hen the corporation is solvent and when
the rights of creditors and other stockholders could not possibly
be affected.
It is submitted that where a contract for the repurchase of
stock is made after the issuance of the stock and after the stock
transaction with the pai-ticular stockholder has been fully exe-
cuted, such a contract should be deemed to be against public
policy and void.19 Such a contract has all the vices of any con-
tract for the withdrawal of corporate assets and does not have
any of the counterbalancing advantages such as beinig for the
"Sarbach v. Kansas Fiscal Agency, 86 Kan. 734, 122 Pacific 113. The
court in this case said, relative to a stockholder who had such an ar-
rangement:
"Were he an ordinary creditor whose money had gone to en-
hance the value of the corporate shares there might be reason why
he should prevail; but the very agreement by which he became a
creditor was unconscionable as between himself and the other un-
willing and unconsenting stockholders and therefore one i hich
equity will not enforce."
"Matthew Brothers v. PulZen, 268 Federal 827; IKeith v. Kilmer, 261
Federal 733, where the court said:
"But it is entirely clear that the transaction out of which the
alleged contract grew was entered into not for the benefit of the
corporation itself, but for the benefit of certain stockholders. In
brief, junior and minority stockholders desired to buy out the
senior and majority stockholders and having no money with which
to buy, the parties agreed not for the benefit of the corporation, but
for the benefit of the trading stockholders to have the corporation,
in form at anyrate, agree to buy and pay for a large part of the
stock intended thus to pass ultimately from the seniors to the
juniors thus giving them control of the corporation and its offices
and emoluments. The corporation was, so to speak, rather an ad-
commodation purchaser for the benefit of certain vending and pur-
chasing stockholders."
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benefit of the corporation itself. If, on the other-hand, the.con-
tract is made at the time of the issuance of the stock and..after
the corporation has been formed and as an inducement to the
,stock sale, then it might well be considered to have been a sale
for the benefit of the corporation in that it might have been in-
tended for the raising of ready money needed by it.
At any rate, by the weight of authority, such contracts are
held not to be ultrai vires and void but enforcible except as
against those creditors and stockholders who.have been actually
prejudiced thereby.20 As before pointed ot, prejudice on the
part of other stockholders must be affirmatively established and
reliance of creditors will not be presumed except on the part of
those becoming such subsequently.21 Therefore it is submitted
that such contracts are not void ab initio but unenforcible only
as against those creditors who have become creditors subse-
quently to the contracts and who have had no knowledge of
them22 and as against those subsequent stockholders who can
affirmatively show tbat they did not. know of their existence' and
that their existence has misled them to their detriment.
Where the contract to repurchase stock even though made
at the time of the stock sale as an inducement thereto and in con-
sideration thereof provides that the option to resell the stock
rests with the holder, such contract should be regarded as sub-
ject to more question for the reason that it puts it in the power
of the stockholder to speculate upon the outcome of the venture
without taking all the risks thereof and contemplates a with-
drawal only in. case of the failing condition of the enterprise.
2"Ophir Consolidated Mines v. Brynst.on, -143 Fed. 829; Porter v.
Plymouth Gold Xining Company, N9 Mont. 347, 74 Pacific 938; Griffin
v. Bank.ers Realty Cbmpany, 105 Neb. 419, 181 N. W. 168; Walradt v.
Barkley, 111 Neb. 67, 195 N. W. 928; Vol. 14 Corpus Juris 575, Par. 858
and cases cited; Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Co., 45 Colo. 81, 100
Pac. 596.
2Walradt v. Barley, cited supra; Handley v. Stutz, cited supra.
"Volume 14 Corpds Juris 571, Par. 850, supported by cases in note
40, lays down the proposition:
"Where a creditor deals with thp corporation with knowledge
of the agreement that only a certain percentage of the parvalue of
each share of stock subscribed is to be paid, he relies only on that
amount and has no equitable right to insist on the collection of
any greater sum from the stockholder than the corporation itself
could claim as a part of its assets."
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The arrangement thus appears to have some elements of bad
faith and to have been made more for the benefit of the stock-
holder than for the purpose of aiding the corporation.
If such a contract to repurchase stock is to be placed on
record as a notice to all persons subsequently dealing with the
corporation and is in fact so placed of record under a statute
providing for constructive notice, certainly no one could be
aleemed to have been misled by the appearance of the stock is-
suance, and therefore, unless the contract is unenforcible on the
grounds of public policy as an absolute rule of law the holder
thereof should be permitted to prove it as a claim even in a court
of bankruptcy.2 3
It is well settled that a corporation may issue its capital
stock as collateral for a loan to the corporation.2 4 But certainly
a bona fide loan arrangement might still mislead creditors sub-
sequently doing business with the bompany and, if so, those
misled by the apparent stock issuance should be protected, if
such situations are to be governed by flexible equitable rules.
By the weight of authority, a contract made with a going
corporation for the repurchase of its stock as an inducement to
and in consideration of the sale thereof is enforcible as against
even subsequent stockholders in the absence of a showing on
their part to the effect that they were misled by the appearance
of the stock transaction.25 It has been held that a preferred
stockholder cannot be a creditor.26
3Allen v. Commercial Bank, 191 Federal 97; Durand v. Brown, 236
Federal 609, the court in this case saying:
"No creditors could reasonably have given credit actually or
constructively on the supposition that the stock was not paid for
... . The corporate records showed the making of the contract
and the subsequent acts and conveyances. . . . The contract
itself was recorded in full in the record of the articles of association
kept by the County Clerk."
2'Wright v. Johnston, 183 Iowa 807, 167 N. W. 680, and cases cited
in note 32, page 416, Volume 14 C. J.
2 Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530, 6 S. W. 582; Walradt v. Barkley,
cited supra.
Smith v. Southern Foundry Company, 166 Ky. 208, 179 S. W. 205;
Armstrong v. United Trust and Savings Bank, 248 Federal 268; Warren
v. King, 108 U. S. 398, where the court said:
"The language of the certificate is entirely satisfied by refer-
ring it to a priority in rank of the preferred stock over the common
stock, to a first claim of the preferred stock on the property of the
corporation after its indebtedness should be paid when there should
be money to be divided among the stockholders."
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As further evidence of the fact that contracts for the re-
purchase of stock made as an inducement to and in considera-
tion of the sale of stock and providing for a definite term of per-
formance, are not unenforcible as an absolute rule of law, it is
only necessary to- point out that the holders of such contracts
have been permitted to prove their claims in bankruptcy sub-
ject to the claims of other creditors. 27
In the case of Durand v. Brown,2 8 a stockholder, at the time
of the issuance of his stock, reserved the right to turn it back and
withdraw his money. True it is that he elected to turn back
the stock while the company was solvent. The fact remains that
at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy about $5,000 o;
principal together with interest remained to be paid to him by
the company on his stock.
If the contention is true that a contract made for the
return of stock is void on the grounds of public policy and that
a stockholder can never compete with creditors, then this case
of Durand v. Brown is in conflict, for the court said:
"Appellee is not attempting to get anything but his advances and
reasonable interest. The corporation has apparently had the benefit of
every dollar of his advances and has been able to operate about eight
years presumably at least in a large measure as a result initially of the
advances made by appellee and his associates. No creditors could
reasonably give credit actually or constructively on the supposition that
the stock in question was not paid for. The stock was issued In the
name of Tildens as paid for; the corporate records showed the making
of the contract and the subsequent acts and conveyances including not
only the bill of sale from the Tildens to the corporation but the bill of
sale to secure the repayment of advances given by the corporation to
the trustees, upon the exercise of the option to receive back the money.
. . . . The contract itself was recorded in the record of Articles of.
Association kept by the County Clerk. The existing creditors became
such subsequent to this time and the alleged "overvaluation was thus
not to the detriment of other interested parties."' '
In the case of Allen v. Commercial Bank,30 the reports of
the corporation listed the stockholder who was seeking to com-
pete with creditors as a holder of stock to the extent of $10,000,
and it was shown that practically all of the corporate indebted-
ness was incurred after the publishing of this list. The court
there held that this stockholder could not be permitted to com-
"In e Morris Brothers Company, 282 Federal 670; Re Feoheimer
Fishel Company, 212 Federal 357.2236 Federal 609.
"See also the case of Seubert -v. Scott, 39 S. D. 278, 169 N W. 75.
w119 Federal 97.
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pete with creditors because it would be inequitable and Tinjust
to- permit him who had thus been held out as a stockholder to
coihpete -with those who had extended credit on the faith of his
position.
If the stock of a corporation has been issued contrary to
law, that is, without a license or in other respects in[ontravention
of statute, it would seem that the stock issuance was absolutely
void anad the persons who would otherwise have been stockhold-
ers should be permitted to recover back their money as general
creditors.P1
It is well settled that a "Blue Sky" statute of a state pro-
viding for a penalty for the lack og a license is not a statute for
revenue purposes but one purely for the protection of the public
against fraud and imposition and that, therefore, the' penalty
provided for failure to secure a permit makes any contract for
the sale of 'stock attempted without such permit absolutely
void.3 2
Of course a claimant could, :with knowledge of the invalid-
ity of the stock issuance, voluntarily benefit by accepting divi-
dends, attending meetings, etc., and act in such a way as to mis-
lead creditors and thus be held to be estopped to set up such il-
legality.33
If a stockholder has been induced by fraudulent misrepre-
sentations as to the condition of the company or other material
fact to purchase his stock, he may rescind.3 4 But creditors may
"An agreement founded on the doing of an act penalized by statute
is void where the penalty is not for revenue purposes. 13 C. J. 421, pars.
352-353, and Inany cases there cited; Reichardt v. Hill, 236 Federal 817.
,Rdward v. Ioo2;, 205 Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620; Rhines v. Skinner
Packing Company, 108 Neb. 105, 187 N. W. 374; Pruitt v. Oklahoma
Steam Baking Company, 390 Oklahoma 509, 135 Pacific 730; American
Tubing Works v. Boston Machine Company, 139 Mass. 5, 29 N. E. 63. In
Prat v. Oklahoma Steam Baking Company, just cited, the court said:
"Where the Issuance of shares is illegal for the want of power
in the .company to issue them and where the shares cannot legally
exist, the person taking them cannot be estopped or otherwise be-
come a member In respect to them ........ The money paid
plaintiff could not, in. fact, have been paid him as dividends as he
was not a stockholder."
Where the statute prohibiting the stock transaction Is a prohibi-
tion upon the- seller only, the parties cannot be deemed to be in par
dellcto, 13 'C. J. 499, par. 443.-
4Madson v. Smith, 290 Federal 939; Allen v. Commercial Bank, 191
Federal 97.
'1n Re Morris Brothers Company, 282 Federal 670; Newton Na.
tiongl Bank v. Newbegin, 74 Federal 135, 20 C. C. A. 339,
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have extended credit in reliance'upon the defrauded stockhold-
er 's investment in the corporate enterprise. In such a case the
court, in-Scott v. Abbott, s 5 said:
"The rights of innocent general creditors are mperior to those of
deceived stockholders. When one of two innocent persons must suffer
by the fraud, of another, the one who has enablqd such third party to
commit the fraud ought to sustain the loss"
Again, if a stockholder, because of misrepresentation, on
the part of corporate officers did not know that he was purchas-
ing stock outright but considered himself to be making a loan to
the corporation, such belief would geem to be of material assist-
ance in helping him to the position of a general creditor for it
would have a direct bearing upon his good faith and in the ab-
sence of a showing that his appearance had caused a change of
ppsition on the part of other stockholders or creditors, should
give him .good standing in a court of equity. Of course it is true
that such a mistake on the part of stockholders would not be
sufficient of itself to relieve them from liability on their stock
purchase, for.the mere fact that a person is misinformed as toi
the effect of his contract does not relieve him from its obliga-
tions.3 6
It is therefore submitted that no general rule can be ar-
bitrarily laid down to the effect that when a corporation is in-
solvent in the sense of not having sufficient assets to actually
pay its general creditors, that a stockholder can, under such
circumstances, never change his status from that of a stockholder
to a general creditor. It is submitted that a stockholder may
have rights as against general creditors even in a bankr.uptcy
court when the status of the stockholder is such that he has not
actually or presumably misled those creditors. On the other
hand a stockholder should not be permitted to have priority
even as against other stockholders, if the arrangement whereby
such priority is stipulated has actually misled such stockholders
in their dealing with the corporation. It is submitted that where
the predominant purpose of the issuance of the stock and the
giving of the right to turn the same back to the corporation is
to aid the corporation in the enterprise and where the contract
provides that the stock is to be taken back at a definite time and
further where such a contract is given in good faith it should not
'1160 Federal 573, at 582.
"Upton v. Tribelcock, 90 U. S. 45.
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.be regarded as being against public policy and therefore neces-
sarily unenforcible, but such a contract should enable the holder
thereof to establish himself in the position of a creditor even
in a court of bankruptcy and such holder should be permitted
to compete with all claimants except those who can show equi-
ties in their favor.
In a close case the rule that in a court of bankruptcy any
doubt as to the probability of a claim is resolved in favor of the
claimant, might be of assistance.37
CLARENCE G. MuiEs,
Lincoln, Nebraska. Attorney at Law.
3Dycus v. Brown, 135 Ky. 140, 121 S. W. 1010.
